The EU’s Human Rights Promotion in China and Myanmar: Trading Rights for Might? EU Diplomacy Paper No. 5, October 2014 by Borreschmidt, Nikolaj
DEPARTMENT OF EU INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS AND DIPLOMACY STUDIES
The EU’s Human Rights 
Promotion in China and 
Myanmar: Trading 
Rights for Might?
Nikolaj Borreschmidt
EU Diplomacy Paper 05 / 2014
  
Department of EU International 
Relations and Diplomacy Studies 
 
 
 
 
EU Diplomacy Papers 
5/2014 
 
 
 
 
 
The EU’s Human Rights Promotion  
in China and Myanmar: 
Trading Rights for Might?  
 
Nikolaj Borreschmidt 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Nikolaj Borreschmidt 2014 
 
 
Dijver 11 | BE-8000 Bruges, Belgium | Tel. +32 (0)50 477 251 | Fax +32 (0)50 477 250 | 
E-mail info.ird@coleurope.eu | www.coleurope.eu/ird  
Nikolaj Borreschmidt 
 2 
About the Author 
 
Nikolaj Borreschmidt graduated from the EU International Relations and Diplomacy 
Studies programme of the College of Europe in 2014. He also obtained a Master of 
Arts in European Studies from Copenhagen Business School in 2013. During his studies 
in Denmark, he was Vice President of political affairs and later President of the Danish 
section of Young European Federalists, as well as a member of the executive 
committee of the Danish European Movement. He is currently a trainee in the 
cabinet of the EU Climate Action Commissioner Connie Hedegaard. This paper is 
based on his Master’s thesis at the College of Europe (Voltaire Promotion). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Editorial Team: 
Nicola Del Medico, Sieglinde Gstöhl, Enrique Ibáñez Gonzalez, Lucas Maurer, 
Jonatan Thompson, Anna Wardell 
Dijver 11 | BE-8000 Bruges, Belgium | Tel. +32 (0)50 477 251 | Fax +32 (0)50 477 250 | 
E-mail ird.info@coleurope.eu | www.coleurope.eu/ird  
Views expressed in the EU Diplomacy Papers are those of the authors only and do 
not necessarily reflect positions of either the series editors or the College of Europe. 
EU Diplomacy Paper 5/2014 
3 
Abstract 
 
This paper aims to answer two questions: generally, to what extent the human rights 
promotion of the European Union (EU) in third countries is consistent, and more 
specifically, why the EU’s approach towards human rights promotion in China and 
Myanmar differs despite similar breaches of human rights. It compares the EU’s 
approach to the two countries over two time periods in the late 1980s and 1990s in 
the context of the EU’s evolving human rights promotion. Based on the two case 
studies, this paper finds that the EU’s human rights promotion in third countries varies 
significantly. Whereas one would expect the EU’s approach to become increasingly 
assertive throughout the 1990s, this has only been the case with Myanmar. China’s 
economic and political importance to the EU appears to have counterweighed the 
general rise in European attention to third countries’ human rights records. In other 
words, this paper finds that commercial interests take precedence over human rights 
concerns in case of important trading partners. 
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Introduction: trading rights for might? 
君子敏于行而讷于言。 
“The superior man is modest in his speech,  
but exceeds in his actions.”  
Confucius, The Analects 
According to the EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and 
Democracy, “[t]he European Union is founded on a shared determination to 
promote peace and stability and to build a world founded on respect for human 
rights, democracy and the rule of law”.1 To this end, the EU has committed itself to 
“promot[e] the universality of human rights”.2 As the EU considers all human rights 
universal, one might expect that this would translate into a human rights promotion 
also universal in nature. With the end of the Cold War, the introduction of political 
conditionality and subsequent Treaty revisions, one could furthermore have 
expected a progressively more assertive human rights promotion by the EU from the 
beginning of the 1990s onwards. However, this paper will argue that this has not 
been the case.  
Looking at the People’s Republic of China (hereafter ‘China’) and the Republic of 
the Union of Myanmar (hereafter ‘Myanmar’), the EU’s approach to human rights 
appears to vary greatly. According to the EU Annual Report on Human Rights and 
Democracy in the World in 2012, the two countries’ records suggest that it would be 
appropriate for the EU to promote the protection of human rights in both countries.3 
Although recognizing improvements in Myanmar, the report expresses concerns 
over the continuing detention of prisoners of conscience, human rights violations of 
“persons belonging to ethnic minorities” as well as the “violence in the Rakhine 
State”.4 In China, the same report urges the Chinese government to ensure minority 
rights in the face of the “self-immolations in Tibet”, and it expresses concerns over 
the “arbitrary detention and enforced disappearance, violations of the right to fair 
trial, as well as of freedom of expression and assembly and freedom of religion or 
belief”.5 Similarly, Freedom House in 2013 termed both countries ‘not free’, Myanmar 
with a freedom rating of 5.5/7 (‘least free’), and China with a freedom rating of 
                                                 
1 Council of the European Union, EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights 
and Democracy, Luxembourg, 25 June 2012, p. 1. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Council of the European Union, EU Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy in the 
World in 2012, Country Report, Brussels, 21 October 2013, pp. 181-182. 
4. Ibid. 
5 Ibid., p. 185. 
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6.5/7. 6  Whereas Myanmar has been subjected to a vast range of restrictive 
measures due to failure to uphold certain human rights standards, 7  China has 
merely been subjected to an arms embargo, apart from a brief period of 
diplomatic sanctions in the late 1980s and early 1990s. This paper aims to clarify why 
the EU has applied such a different approach towards human rights promotion in 
China and Myanmar respectively. To that end, this paper asks the following 
questions: 
- To what extent does the EU’s human rights promotion in third countries vary 
despite similar breaches?  
- Why is the EU’s approach towards human rights promotion in China 
inconsistent with its approach towards Myanmar? 
The paper’s initial hypotheses are the following: 
- With the emergence of a unipolar, Western dominated world after the Cold 
War, the introduction of political conditionality and subsequent Treaty 
revisions, the EU should have progressively become more assertive in its 
human rights promotion throughout the 1990s.  
- Despite similar violations of human rights, additional factors, which set China 
apart from Myanmar, have acted as a counterweight to the increased 
promotion of human rights. In 2013, China ranked as the EU’s second biggest 
trading partner; whereas Myanmar ranked as number 132 in 2013.8 The EU, as 
well as EU member states, are becoming more reluctant to pursue a human 
rights agenda due to China’s rising relative economic and political 
importance. In other words, trade concerns take precedence over human 
rights concerns, and the EU appears to be trading rights over might. 
 
The rest of the first section will address the methodological choices I have made in 
order to address my research questions. The second section will address human 
rights from an EU perspective, arguing that such values are universal. Further, it will 
argue that we, in theory, should observe a growing assertiveness in European 
human rights promotion throughout the 1990s, due to the EU’s Treaty changes and 
                                                 
6Freedom House, Asia-Pacific, 2014, retrieved 1 February 2014, http://www.freedomhouse. 
org/regions/asia-pacific.  
7 M. Bünte & C. Portela, “Myanmar: The Beginning of Reforms and the End of Sanctions”, 
GIGA Focus, no. 3, 2012, p. 5. 
8  European Commission, “Top trading partners”, retrieved 27 September 2014, 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_122530.pdf, Brussels, DG 
Trade, 27 August 2014. 
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change in narrative. The following comparison will, however, show that while this 
holds true for Myanmar, it has not been the case for China, despite similar breaches 
of human rights. The third section will then engage in a comparative analysis of 
what sets these two countries apart – the two most decisive variables appearing to 
be their relative economic and political importance to the EU.  
Methodology: choice of countries, time periods and definitions 
In order to keep possible selection bias as small as possible, the paper will work with 
two Asian countries. The fact that both countries lie within the same region should 
further rule out additional disturbing variables, such as geographical distance from 
the EU. In other words, this paper will make use of the ‘most similar systems design’, 
attempting to clarify whether ‘economic importance to the EU’ and ‘political 
importance to the EU’ are explanatory variables in terms of the EU’s human rights 
promotion. 
The end of the Cold War coincided with the introduction of more systematic 
political conditionality in EU foreign policy. The European Community imposed the 
first Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) sanctions on Myanmar in 1990,9 
following the military junta’s failure to respect the elections in that year.10 In the 
same period the Community introduced an arms embargo, alongside other 
measures, on China following Beijing’s violent repression of the Tiananmen Square 
protests in 1989. 1989-1990 will thus serve as a starting point for the timeframe of this 
paper. Further CFSP sanctions were imposed on Myanmar in 1996, and the 
Generalized Scheme of Preferences (GSP) preferences were withdrawn by the 
Council the following year.11 As for China, the first EU-China Dialogues took place in 
1995; the European Parliament unsuccessfully attempted to persuade the 
Commission to open an investigation into forced labour in the same period, and in 
1997-1998 the Council concluded that the annual practice of tabling motions at the 
United Nations (UN) Commission on Human Rights on the Chinese human rights 
violations should end. 1995-1997 are therefore years that are crucial in order to 
understand the EU’s response to human rights violations and why the Union decided 
to impose additional measures on Myanmar but not on China.  
                                                 
9 C. Portela & J. Orbie, “Sanctions under the EU Generalised System of Preferences and 
foreign policy: coherence by accident?”, Contemporary Politics, vol. 20, no. 1, 2014, p. 68. 
10  C. Portela & P. Vennesson, “Sanctions and Embargos in EU-Asia Relations”, in T. 
Christiansen, E. Kirchner & P. Murray (eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of EU-Asia Relations, 
Basingstoke, Palgrave MacMillan, 2013, p. 203. 
11 Ibid. 
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Within the framework of the CFSP, sanctions are generally referred to as ‘restrictive 
measures’ in the EU system. For the sake of clarity, however, the term ‘sanctions’ will 
be used as a common term encompassing all EU restrictive measures for the 
purpose of this paper. Secondly, rhetorical instruments such as condemnations, 
declarations and demarches will only be analysed briefly. As should be apparent in 
the second section, the EU has fully committed itself to the promotion of human 
rights, and rhetorical instruments appear somewhat redundant in such a context, 
unless they are followed up by a form of sanction. Thirdly, withdrawal of the GSP 
benefits will only be analysed briefly. Portela and Orbia argue that such a form of 
sanctions is directly linked with ILO condemnations,12 which China never faced.13 
For the purpose of this paper, inconsistency will be defined as ‘the absence of 
contradictions’. 14  The reports of Human Rights Watch (HRW) will be used to 
compare the human rights situations in China and Myanmar throughout the 
abovementioned time periods, as the EU did not publish annual reports on human 
rights in the 1990s. HRW is independent insofar it does not accept government funds 
or private funds that could compromise its objectivity. 15  Although it has been 
criticized for being influenced by American politics, it nonetheless provides a more 
unbiased picture than official American documents.  
The EU’s policy of human rights promotion 
 
The entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in December 2009 provided several 
radical changes in the EU’s approach to human rights, arguably transforming the EU 
into “a new type of human rights actor”. 16  The preamble to the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, formerly a political declaration but now 
ensured legal effect, states that the EU “is founded on the indivisible, universal 
values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity; it is based on the 
principles of democracy and the rule of law”.17 The EU considers “all human rights – 
                                                 
12 Portela & Orbie, op.cit. 
13  However, one might further point out that the ILO Commission of Enquiry report on 
Myanmar came out only after the withdrawal of the GSP benefits, which makes the linkage 
between the two a bit more blurry. 
14 C. Portela & K. Raube, “Revisiting Coherence in EU Foreign Policy”, Hamburg Review of 
Social Sciences, vol. 3, no. 1, 2008, p. 3. 
15 Human Rights Watch, “About Us”, Human Rights Watch, New York, retrieved 28 April 2014, 
http://www.hrw.org/about. 
16 H. Brady, ”The EU and human rights: a new era under the Lisbon Treaty?”, Open Society 
Initiative for Europe, Brussels, 2010, p. 10. 
17 European Union, “Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty 
on the Function of the European Union and Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union”, March 2010, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, preamble.  
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civil, political, economic, social and cultural – […] universal in nature, valid for 
everyone, everywhere. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms is at 
the core of the European Union”.18 Without exceptions, the EU aims to promote 
human rights in all areas of its external action, and it will particularly “integrate the 
promotion of human rights into trade”,19 and “when faced with violations of human 
rights, the EU will make use of the full range of instruments at its disposal, including 
sanctions or condemnation”.20 To this end, the EU has developed a series of tools 
both within the CFSP and within the framework of the Community. The Lisbon Treaty 
furthermore gives the European Parliament increased parliamentary control over 
trade agreements, since the Council now needs the consent of the Parliament for 
the conclusion of an agreement.21 The European Parliament has been known to 
take a strong stance on human rights promotion,22 and increased influence of the 
European Parliament would, ceteris paribus, imply more focus on human rights 
issues around the world, as does the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty as a whole.  
In a 2014 context, the promotion of human rights thus appears to be high up on the 
EU’s agenda. Yet, the EU’s approach to human rights promotion has only reached 
its current level of development in a piecemeal fashion.  
The gradual evolution of the EU’s policy of human rights 
In their first decades of existence, the Communities were not perceived as a global 
human rights promoter in their own right, and the practice of adopting sanctions 
outside the framework of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) was only 
established in the early 1980s. In 1988, the Rhodes Declaration stated that “Europe 
can not [sic] but actively demonstrate its solidarity to the great and spreading 
movement for democracy and full support for the principles of the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights”.23 Another major step forward was achieved with the 
landmark 1991 Luxembourg Declaration by the European Council, stating that 
“[t]hrough their policy and cooperation and by including clauses on human rights in 
                                                 
18 European Commission: External Relations, The European Union: Furthering Human Rights 
and Democracy Across the Globe, Brussels, 2007, p. 6. 
19 Council of the European Union, EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights 
and Democracy, 11855/12, Luxembourg, 25 June 2012, p. 2. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Lisbon, op.cit., art. 218(6)(a)(i) TFEU. 
22 R. Wong, “Towards a Common European Policy on China? Economic, Diplomatic and 
Human Rights Trends since 1985”, Current Politics and Economics of Asia, vol. 17, no. 1, 2008, 
p. 170. 
23 European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency: Declaration of the European Council on 
the International Role of the European Community, Rhodes, 3 December, 1988, p. 18. 
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economic and cooperation agreements with third countries, the Community and its 
member states actively promote human rights”.24 These human rights clauses, also 
including respect for democratic principles, have nowadays been incorporated 
into nearly all agreements with third parties. The Treaty of Maastricht, signed in 1991 
and entering into force in 1993, codified the principle of imposing Community 
sanctions 25 and further stated that one of the objectives of the CFSP was the 
development and consolidation of democracy, the rule of law, respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms. The imposition of the first sanctions on Myanmar, 
as well as the arms embargo on China, thus happened prior to both the 
Luxembourg Declaration and the Treaty of Maastricht, but in the immediate 
aftermath of the Rhodes Declaration. 
The measures imposed on Myanmar in 1996 and 1997, the second period identified 
above, on the other hand happened within the Maastricht legal framework. To 
what extent do the two time periods then differ? That the EU was considered an 
appropriate forum for sanctions and that it had committed itself to human rights 
through the Rhodes Declaration is thus the case for both time periods. However, the 
CFSP only came into force with the Maastricht Treaty, having formerly been the 
European Political Co-operation (EPC), a looser consultation process between 
member states. Thus, in the second time period, one might expect a firmer 
commitment to human rights promotion given that: 1) the EPC had been 
strengthened and turned into the CFSP, expressing the will of the EU to assert its 
position on the international scene; 26  and 2) the European Community had 
expressed willingness to apply political conditionality in 1991. With the introduction 
of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999, the values upon which the EU is founded, such 
as the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, were reaffirmed. 
Moreover, the Treaty of Amsterdam provided that development policies as well as 
economic, financial and technical cooperation with third countries should 
contribute to these objectives, 27  and a High Representative for the CFSP was 
appointed. Signed during the second time period of interest for this paper, in 
                                                 
24 European Council, “Presidency Conclusions”, Bulletin 02.07.91, Luxembourg, 28-29 June 
1991, p. 27. 
25 C. Portela, European Union Sanctions and Foreign Policy: When and Why Do the Work?, 
New York, Routledge, 2010, pp. 23-24. 
26 “Summaries of EU legislation: Common Foreign and Security Policy”, European Union, 
retrieved 22 April 2014, http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/ 
amsterdam_treaty/a19000_en.htm. 
27 Commission, The European Union: Furthering Human Rights and Democracy Across the 
Globe, op.cit., p. 6. 
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October 1997, the Amsterdam Treaty should therefore represent an additional step 
in the promotion of human rights for the EU.  
From the above, it would appear that the first hypothesis, at least from a 
declaratory point of view, has been confirmed. Throughout the 1990s, the EU 
gradually devoted itself more and more to human rights promotion in the world, 
embodied in the Treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam and Lisbon.  
The EU response to China’s human rights record 
The Communities imposed the arms embargo on China in 1989 “strongly 
condemn[ing]” the Chinese “brutal repression” of the Tiananmen protests, 
requesting that the Chinese authorities respect human rights, freedom and 
democracy.28 Alongside the arms embargo were a range of additional measures 
such as an interruption in military cooperation and the suspension of bilateral 
ministerial and high-level contacts.29 This appears to be coherent with the Rhodes 
Declaration of 1988.  
However, although the arms embargo has remained in place since, the rest of the 
mostly diplomatic measures were lifted already in October 1990.30 To be sure, the 
Chinese authorities lifted martial law in January 1990, perceived as justification to 
remove the sanctions in place.31 However, HRW at the time bluntly argued that 
“[t]he year 1990 was a bad one for human rights in China”.32 All aspects of freedom 
of expression were imposed governmental control, and restrictions of religious and 
ethnic groups were tightened. Among students, free speech and political activities 
were restricted. The government further severely curtailed the right of assembly and 
public demonstrations and tightened the control and imposed surveillance and 
intimidation of the media. Although Chinese authorities announced the release of 
several pro-democracy detainees, HRW called into question the validity of this 
announcement. The release from detention furthermore did not necessarily mean 
                                                 
28 European Council, Presidency Conclusions: Annex II: Declaration on China, Madrid, 27 
June 1989, p. 25. 
29 Ibid. 
30  G. Wacker, ”Ende des EU-Waffenembargos gegen China”, Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik, 2004, p. 2. 
31 N. Casarini, “The evolution of the EU-China relationship: from constructive engagement to 
strategic partnership”, European Union Institute for Security Studies: Occasional Paper, no. 
64, Paris, October 2006, p. 10.  
32 Human Rights Watch, World Report 1990: China, New York, Human Rights Watch, 1990, 
retrieved 9 April 2014, http://www.hrw.org/reports/1990/WR90/ASIA.BOU-04.htm#P241_ 
56227. 
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the end of governmental reprisals, as HRW reported several cases of investigations 
and constant police escorts for former prisoners, as well as harassment of pro-
democratic academics and intellectuals. Trials of the 1989 detainees hardly met 
international standards, and one punishment included ‘labour re-education’, a 
governmental euphemism for forced labour under arbitrary detention.33 Freedom 
House deemed China ‘not free’ in 1990, giving the country the lowest score for both 
civil liberties and political rights.34 Thus, the lifting of all measures save the arms 
embargo appears peculiar. 
In 1995, the Chinese government “continue[d] to demonstrate its disdain for 
fundamental human rights guarantees and the rule of law”.35 Imprisonment and 
physical abuse of activists engaged in peaceful dissent persisted, and HRW reports 
that some continued to “disappear”, while their families were threatened or 
harassed.36 The rule of law was continuously subverted by the government, and 
challengers of the one-party system were levied sentences up to 20 years. ‘Labour 
re-education’ was kept as a form of punishment, and there were further reports of 
maltreatment of prisoners. Independent religious practice was hampered; the 
media continued to be censored; and the freedom of expression was further 
restricted. Freedom of assembly and association was likewise further curtailed.37 
Freedom House continued to deem China ‘not free’, maintaining the lowest score 
in both political rights and civil liberties.38 In response to this, the EU and the US 
attempted to sponsor a resolution criticizing the situation in China in the United 
Nation Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) in Geneva, which, however, failed.39 
1995 further saw the beginning of the biannual dialogues on human rights between 
the EU and China, ironically based on a Chinese proposal.40 However, in their power 
audit of EU-China relations Fox and Godement argue that the Human Rights 
                                                 
33 Ibid. 
34 Freedom House, Country ratings and status, FIW 1973-2014 (EXCEL), Washington D.C., 2014, 
retrieved 10 April 2014, http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world. 
35 Human Rights Watch, World Report 1996: China & Tibet, New York, 1996, retrieved 10 April 
2014, http://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/WR96/Asia-02.htm# P250_71314. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Freedom House, Country ratings and status, op.cit. 
39 Human Rights Watch/Asia, China: Chinese Diplomacy, Western Hypocrisy and the U.N. 
Human Rights Commission, New York, 1997, p. 3. 
40 European Commission: External Relations, The European Union: Furthering Human Rights 
and Democracy Across the Globe, op.cit., p. 13. 
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Dialogues in fact are hardly more than a charade, used by China to “deflect the 
European urge to adopt critical public resolutions”.41  
Moreover, only in July 1995 was a common position on China officially defined with 
the Commission Communication “A Long Term Policy for China-Europe Relations”.42 
Although the Communication focuses on the Chinese economy and the potential 
for the European market,43 it also addresses the issue of human rights.44 The EU was 
to engage in human rights promotion in China on three levels: 1) through support for 
the Chinese liberalization and opening up of the economy; 2) through 
systematically raising the question in bilateral dialogues; and 3) through engaging 
the international community, for instance in the United Nations. 45 
Although HRW notes positive progress towards due process for criminal suspects in 
1996, 46  it also argues that the Chinese human rights record in fact worsened 
between 1995 and 1996.47 The Chinese government continued to curtail freedom of 
expression, especially through controlling public access to the internet. Persecution 
of political and religious dissidents persisted, and repression intensified especially in 
Tibet, where HRW also reported torture. Likewise, the harassment of Catholics and 
Protestants continued. Arrests of pro-democracy and human rights activists also 
continued, some of which were subjected to ‘labour re-education’. Moreover, 
reports of torture of detainees and prisoners persisted. Once again, Freedom House 
deemed the country ‘not free’, maintaining the lowest scores.48 In 1996, another EU 
and US-sponsored resolution on China in the UNCHR was attempted, strongly 
backed by a resolution of the European Parliament.49 Efforts proved futile, however, 
as the resolution once again failed, this time even being subjected to a ‘no-action’ 
motion which prevented that the subject was even being debated.50 In 1997, the 
European Parliament furthermore attempted to convince the Commission to 
commence an investigation into the alleged forced and prison labour practices 
                                                 
41 J. Fox & F. Godement, A Power Audit of EU-China Relations, London, European Council on 
Foreign Relations, 2009, p. 34. 
42 European Commission, A Long Term Policy for China-Europe Relations, COM(95) 279, 
Brussels, 15 July 1995. 
43 Casarini, op.cit., p. 10. 
44 European Commission, A Long Term Policy for China-Europe Relations, op.cit., pp. 5-7. 
45 Ibid., p. 6. 
46 Human Rights Watch, World Report 1997: China, New York, 1997, retrieved 10 April 2014, 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1997/WR97/ASIA-03.htm#P164_85228. 
47 Human Rights Watch/Asia, op.cit., p. 3. 
48 Freedom House, Country ratings and status, op.cit. 
49  European Parliament, Parliament Resolution on Human Rights in China and Tibet, 
Strasbourg, 1996, retrieved 10 April 2014, http://www.tibetjustice.org/materials/ep/ep11.html. 
50 Human Rights Watch/Asia, op.cit., p. 4. 
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with a view to removing the Chinese GSP benefits, calling upon the EU-Sino 
relationship to reflect the objectives of the CFSP as laid down in the Treaty. 51 
However, due to procedural requirements at the time, the Commission refused to 
begin such an investigation. Thus, even though the Chinese human rights violations 
continued throughout the time periods in question, only the arms embargo 
remained in place, whereas the initial additional measures were quickly dropped. 
This differs starkly from the EU’s approach towards Myanmar during the same time 
periods. 
The EU response to Myanmar’s human rights record 
The Burmese military government, the State Law and Order Restoration Council 
(SLORC) took power in 1988, and remained in power through martial law 
throughout 1989. HRW reported dismal conditions for human rights in the country: 
Political freedom was reported to be virtually non-existent, and perceived anti-
government activities led to one of three sentences: three years imprisonment, life 
imprisonment or death penalty. 52  Torture of prisoners was further reported as 
‘routine’. The government retained control of the media, and the SLORC in 1990 
kept all universities and most secondary schools closed for the third year in a row. 
The late 1989 and early 1990 further saw the forced eviction of well over 500’000 
people from the capital to the countryside, often to areas without electricity, 
running water or proper sanitation. The Burmese army was reported to have killed, 
tortured or raped numerous civilians in their effort to thwart rebellions among ethnic 
minorities.53 Freedom House deemed Burma ‘not free’, giving the country the lowest 
score in both political rights and civil liberties.54 1990 saw the beginning of the 
Community’s response to the human rights situation in Myanmar, culminating in 
what has been described by Portela and Vennesson as “one of the most far-
reaching and long-lasting sets of restrictive measures” ever taken by the EU.55 The 
measures, imposed in 1990 and confirmed in a Declaration by the General Affairs 
Council on 29 July 1991, encompassed an “expulsion of all military personnel 
                                                 
51 European Parliament, “Report on the Communication from the Commission on a long 
term policy for China–Europe relations (COM(95)0279 – C4-0288/95)”, Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, Security and Defence Policy, Rapporteur: Mr Edward McMillan-Scott, 29 May 1997, 
pp. 4-5. 
52 Human Rights Watch, World Report 1990: Burma, New York, 1990, retrieved 11 April 2014, 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1990/WR90/ASIA.BOU-02.htm# P101_22000. 
53 Human Rights Watch, World Report 1990: Burma, op.cit. 
54 Freedom House, Country ratings and status, op.cit. 
55 Portela & Vennesson, Sanctions and Embargos in EU-Asia Relations, op.cit., p. 199. 
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attached to the diplomatic representation of Burma/Myanmar” and “an embargo 
on arms, munitions and military equipment and suspension of non-humanitarian aid 
or development programmes”.56  
1995 saw the release of opposition leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi after six years of 
house arrest, although HRW reported “no overall improvement in the human rights 
situation”.57 More than 200 political prisoners were released; yet, there were cases of 
new arrests and at least 1’000 remaining prisoners of conscience. Torture was 
reported regularly. Freedom of speech, association and religion, as well as the right 
of citizens to participate in the political process were continuously curtailed by the 
SLORC. As war between the Burmese army and ethnic minority rebels continued, 
civilians were forced into unpaid labour for the army across the country, and HRW 
called the use of forced labour in Myanmar “endemic”.58 As the regime opened 
the country to foreign investments, the SLORC forced thousands of civilians and 
prisoners to rebuild the neglected infrastructure.59 Freedom House maintained the 
lowest possible score in terms of political rights and civil liberties.60 The Common 
Position of 28 October 1996 addressed the “continuing violation of human rights in 
Burma/Myanmar […] deplor[ing], in particular, the practice of torture, summary and 
arbitrary executions, forced labour, abuse of women, political arrests, forced 
displacement of the population and restrictions of the fundamental rights of 
freedom of speech, movement and assembly”.61 The Common Position reaffirmed 
the EU measures already in place and called for several additional ones: a visa ban 
for senior members of SLORC and their families; visa bans for senior members of the 
military and security forces; and the suspension of high-level bilateral government 
visits to Myanmar.62  
In 1996, the SLORC continued to carry on political arrests, as the country plunged 
into a confrontation between the SLORC and the National League for Democracy 
(NLD), led by Suu Kyi. Several NLD members of parliament were arrested in their 
                                                 
56  “EU arms embargo on Myanmar (Burma)”, Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute, 7 May 2013, retrieved 11 April 2014, http://www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes/ 
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attempt to attend the first general party meeting since 1990, and although most 
were released quickly, the government-controlled media subsequently announced 
many of their resignations, mostly due to ‘health reasons’. Forced labour, forced 
relocation and arbitrary arrests continued, and in ethnic minority areas, some 85’000 
civilians were forcefully evicted to military-run camps or garrison towns. Torture 
continued, and HRW reported at least two deaths during detention. As the war 
against ethnic minority rebels continued, many were forced into conscription, 
including underage boys.63 Unsurprisingly, Freedom House maintained the low score 
in 1997.64  
As a response to the miserable conditions in Myanmar, the EU in the years 1995-1997 
initiated the process to withdraw the country’s GSP benefits. Originally triggered by 
a joint complaint of the European Trade Union Confederation and the International 
Confederation of Free Unions in 1995, the Council in 1997 approved a regulation for 
withdrawal, on account of “the use of forced labour”.65 An ILO Commission of 
Enquiry was established in 1996, which two years later reported the violation of the 
“obligation to suppress the use of force or compulsory labour”, as well as an actual 
practice of forced labour “in a widespread and systematic manner”.66 In Myanmar, 
the European measures were accompanied by American measures, such as the US 
trade ban and suspension of trade preferences. In 1990, the Americans imposed 
economic sanctions on Burmese products; 67  in 1994 and 1995 the Americans 
withheld contributions to several international organizations with programmes in 
Myanmar (among other states);68 and in 1996 and 1997, the European measures 
were furthermore reflected in three American measures. In October 1996, 
Presidential Proclamation 6925 denied entry into the US for “persons who formulate 
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or implement policies that impede Burma’s transition to democracy” 69; in 1997 
further sanctions were imposed on Myanmar, including the suspension of bi- and 
multilateral assistance except humanitarian aid and visa bans for Burmese 
officials;70 and in 1997, an American executive order imposed a prohibition on new 
investments in Myanmar, declaring a “national emergency” in regards to the 
country.71 
China-Myanmar comparison: human rights violations 
As should be apparent from the beginning of this section, the EU does not engage 
in a ‘ranking’ of human rights, as these are considered both universal and 
indivisible.72 All human rights – civil, political economic, social and cultural – are 
considered not only universal,73 but also appear to be considered equal. However, 
if the EU considers all human rights universal, and furthermore commits itself to using 
the whole range of tools available to promote them, one might be inclined to 
expect a reaction beyond declaratory policy in case of extensive and persistent 
violations of human rights. Although the scope is difficult to compare, the nature of 
violations in China and Myanmar appear similar. Throughout the 1990s, both the 
Chinese and the Burmese governments engaged in obstruction of the rule of law; 
basic freedoms such as the freedom of expression, of religion and of assembly were 
curtailed, and torture of detainees was furthermore reported. Moreover, both 
countries engaged in arbitrary detentions and arrests, as well as forced labour. 
Hence, certeris paribus, one would expect the EU to impose similar sanctions on 
both countries. Yet this was not the case. The following section will attempt to 
determine which factors might explain the diverging EU approaches to China and 
Myanmar, arguing that two important factors seem to be the two countries’ relative 
political and economic relevance to the EU.  
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Political and economic importance to the EU: trading rights for might 
 
From the above we should expect to see at least two things: a China whose relative 
importance to the EU is much bigger than that of Myanmar; and if we accept the 
second hypothesis, a China whose importance has since 1989 risen much more 
rapidly than that of Burma, since EU sanctions have only increased in the latter 
case, despite similar breaches. I have chosen the following criteria to define relative 
economic power: gross domestic product (GDP); economic size and share of EU 
trade. In terms of relative political power, the following criteria have been selected, 
partly building on Niall Ferguson’s list:74 Financial power and diplomacy, measured 
through power within financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the World Bank, and power within the United Nations framework; as well 
as multinational companies (MNCs). 
China has become an increasingly important trading partner for the EU. As a result 
of impressive growth in GDP throughout the 1990s, often at double digits, the 
Chinese market expanded from being the world’s tenth largest in terms of nominal 
GDP in 1990 to the second largest in 2010.75 Similarly, China is now the second most 
important trading partner for the EU, with bilateral trade worth more than €1 billion 
every day.76 Myanmar, in comparison, has remained relatively unimportant for the 
EU. According to Eurostat, EU exports to Myanmar in 1989 amounted to €74 million.77 
Even before the imposition of sanctions, Myanmar thus represented an insignificant 
trading partner, which is still true with Myanmar ranking as the EU’s 115th largest 
trading partner in 2013 in terms of imports, and the 131th largest partner in terms of 
exports.78 The Burmese growth in GDP has been steady throughout the 1990s, 79 and 
the nominal GDP in 2014 is reported to have reached roughly US$ 65 billion, with a 
further estimate of reaching roughly US$ 90 billion by 2017.80 However, even with 
such a somewhat positive estimate, it is clear that China has always been, and will 
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continue to be, immensely more important to the EU than Myanmar in terms of 
trade.  
China’s rising economic relevance also translates into growing political power. In 
international organizations such as the IMF and the World Bank, recent 
redistributions of quotas reflect the shift of “the tectonic plates of economy”, as the 
then World Bank president Zoellick said in 2011.81 In the World Bank, China’s share of 
votes rose from 2.77% to 4.42% in 2010, overtaking European nations such as 
Germany, Britain and France;82 and in the realignment of quotas in the IMF in 2010, 
China became the third largest member country.83 China furthermore holds one of 
the permanent seats in the UNSC, and has on numerous occasions proven that it 
intends to use its diplomatic power in the UN, for instance through passing motions 
of no-actions when faced by Western attempts to pass critical resolutions on China. 
Furthermore, Fox and Godement argue that “[w]henever possible, Chinese 
negotiators will avoid negotiating with European interlocutors who are empowered 
to speak for the EU as a whole, bringing its combined weight to bear”,84 which 
would translate into political power relative to the EU. Myanmar on the other hand, 
a member of the same organizations as China, wields much less power. The 
Chinese global presence through MNCs has also increased strongly since the early 
1990s,85 whereas there does not appear to have been much improvement in the 
Burmese case.86 Thus, China is not only much more politically important to the EU – it 
also has more power to counteract unfavourable measures in multilateral 
institutions. 
It was only when Myanmar in 1997 gained membership of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) that a further development took place. According 
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to the Commission, the recently concluded free trade agreement with Singapore 
(EUSFTA) “has the potential to lay the ground for the EU to engage in the region as a 
whole”87 – a reference to the ASEAN. The ASEAN region collectively constitutes the 
EU’s third largest trading partner, with €206 billion of trade in goods in 2011, and 
some €44 billion of trade in services in 2010. 88  Thus, the political relevance of 
Myanmar has arguably grown since its accession to ASEAN, as trade with the region 
already in 1997 reached roughly ECU 45 billion in exports and imports.89 If this is the 
case, then the second hypothesis appears to be incorrect, since the EU in fact 
continued its firm promotion of human rights in the country. Yet, the beginning of 
the membership saw Myanmar and ASEAN as “estranged bedfellows”. 90  The 
marriage was one of inconvenience, as McCarthy calls it, 91  which arguably 
translated into very limited Burmese political significance within the ASEAN. In 2006, 
when the West was able to successfully pressure Myanmar into declining their first 
chance of a chairmanship,92 the organization itself noted that it “could severely 
affect the organization’s international credibility”.93 However, the EU-ASEAN Free 
Trade Agreement negotiations have been stalled since 2009, 94  despite the 
economic importance of the region, leading the Commission to conclude that 
bilateral free trade agreements, such as the EUSFTA, should constitute building 
blocks for a wider region-to-region agreement. One might point out that the 
momentum perhaps achieved by the initialling of the EUSFTA in September 2013 
coincides with the lifting of all sanctions on Myanmar, save the arms embargo, the 
same year, as well as the reinstatement of Myanmar in the GSP framework in July 
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2013. Nevertheless, HRW,95 Amnesty International96 and Freedom House97 point out 
that there remain significant improvements to be made in the Burmese human 
rights record. The EU’s annual report on human rights released in 2013 also 
recognizes improvements, but continues to call attention to the human rights 
violations in Myanmar,98 as does the EEAS.99 
Individual EU member state preferences: trade wins over rights 
EU sanctions encompass a diverse mix of decision-making procedures, some of 
which require unanimity, and the EU can therefore not always be considered as a 
bloc. According to Baker, it was clear already by the time the European sanctions 
on China were put in place that there had been disagreement in the Council.100 
Although the precise positions of the member states are not clear, Baker argues 
that for instance Germany likely favoured a more gentle approach to China, 
whereas France – contrary to its later stances – favoured stronger measures.101 The 
annual tradition of tabling motions against China in the UNCHR throughout the 
1990s also eventually revealed cracks in European unity. In 1997, after successive 
failed motions, France, backed by Germany, Italy and Spain, contended the 
rationale behind such procedures, arguing that they only soured relations with 
Beijing.102 Although opposed by states like Denmark, the Netherlands and the UK, it 
was eventually decided that “the EU would ‘neither propose, nor endorse’ any 
resolution criticising China” at the upcoming UNCHR session, a position that has 
remained constant since.103 This, of course, appears to be in stark contrast with the 
Commission’s 1995 Communication mentioned above, in which the EU should 
promote human rights in China through the international community. Furthermore, 
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recurring debates on the arms embargo likewise showed very diverging opinions on 
the issue. 
The potential lift of the arms embargo was initially proposed by Germany and 
France in the European Council in 2003, eventually supported by Italy, Spain, the UK, 
Finland and the Netherlands.104 When looking at the areas in which a removal of 
the arms embargo would open up trade – commercial aircraft, automobiles and 
civil engineering105 – it makes economic sense for these specific countries to have 
argued for it. Germany, France and the UK have large aerospace industries, and 
the sector is also important for countries such as Spain and the Netherlands.106 
Several of the countries advocating a lifting of the arms embargo in 2003 had 
prominent automobile industries, 107  and in terms of civil engineering, France, 
Germany, Spain, the UK and the Netherlands have sizeable industries in this sector. 
The countries proposing and backing a potential removal of the arms embargo 
therefore all seemed to have economic incentives for doing so. A potential lift of 
the arms embargo thus appears to be driven by trade concerns by individual 
member States. Furthermore, this group of countries is also to a large extent the 
same that argued in 1997 that the practice of tabling annual motions on China in 
the UNCHR should be ceased.  
The EU arms embargo was accompanied by an American one from 1989 
onwards.108 The attempts to lift the European arms embargo in the early 2000s were 
met with the diplomatic wrath of the US, which eventually led the EU to maintain 
it. 109  US Congressional concerns evolved around two major issues: US security 
interests and the continuous violations of human rights in China.110 However, as 
Portela and Vennesson argue, the European arms embargo in no way contributes 
towards the improvement of human rights in China, and could be considered 
mostly symbolic.111 Secondly, is has been argued that the arms embargo in fact 
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plays a small role in terms of the actual trade in arms between China and the EU: 
firstly because the arms embargo does not cover a range of sensitive items, and 
secondly because the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports would arguably kick in 
in case of a suspension of the arms embargo.112 Neither Congressional concerns 
thus appear particularly warrant. Perhaps this is why Portela and Vennesson argue 
that the American opposition to the lifting is also driven by commercial interests, 
especially within the aviation industry. 113  The perennial Airbus/Boeing disputes 
clearly show the importance of the sector for both sides of the Atlantic.  
 
Conclusion 
This paper set out to answer two questions: generally, to what extent the EU’s 
human rights promotion varies in third countries despite similar breaches; and more 
specifically, why the EU’s approach towards human rights promotion differs 
between China and Myanmar. To this end, the paper established two initial 
hypotheses: 1) throughout the 1990s, the EU should progressively have become a 
more assertive human rights promoter in third countries; 2) additional factors have 
acted as counterweight to an increasingly persistent promotion of human rights in 
China, whereas in Myanmar they have not, and such factors could be economic 
and political power relative to the EU.  
The first hypothesis appears to have been confirmed from a declaratory point of 
view. With the establishment of the EU as a framework for sanctions, the 1991 
Luxembourg Declaration called upon political conditionality to guide trade and 
cooperation agreements with third countries. The Maastricht Treaty established the 
CSDP in an effort to assert the EU’s position on the international scene, and the 
Treaty of Amsterdam further stressed the EU’s commitment to human rights. The 
case study of Myanmar also appears to confirm the first hypothesis. However, 
looking at the second case study, China, the first hypothesis no longer holds up. In 
regards to the first research question, we can thus conclude that the EU’s human 
rights promotions vary significantly across countries. Despite similar breaches of 
basic human rights, the EU applied more sanctions to Myanmar and fewer to China.  
The two case studies confirm the second hypothesis: a different approach to 
human rights promotion in China and Myanmar must point to different variables in 
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the two countries respectively. The second hypothesis further states that economic 
and political power relative to the EU are important variables differentiating the two 
case studies, and hence the explanation why the EU’s human rights promotions in 
the two countries have been inconsistent. This, in turn, leads us to the second 
research question.  
Indeed, the reason why the EU’s human rights promotion differs in Myanmar and 
China appears to relate to their different economic and political importance to the 
EU. China has progressively grown to rank as the EU’s second largest trading 
partner. Myanmar, on the other hand, ranks as the 131st largest partner in terms of 
exports, and has remained relatively insignificant throughout the two time periods. 
Economic power further translates into political power in the international order 
within organizations such as the UN, IMF and WTO, where China often outranks 
some of the larger European countries. China has furthermore skilfully taken 
advantage of individual member state preferences, a feat Myanmar has not been 
able to replicate. China thus offers economically more opportunities for the EU, and 
therefore higher opportunity costs in case of sanctions, than does Myanmar; and 
China wields much more power in the international system, and thus potential to 
withstand European pressure, than Myanmar does.  
As regards member state differences, commercial interests appear to take 
precedence over human rights concerns as well. The international response has 
furthermore been an important factor determining the EU’s response to human 
rights violations, and generally, the EU and the US appear to have followed the 
same approach in both cases. The debate on the potential lifting of the arms 
embargo clearly revealed commercial interests on both sides. It does therefore not 
seem plausible that the EU would apply stricter sanctions on China without 
matching American measures, since this arguably would have economic 
repercussions. In the case of Myanmar, the EU could afford to do so for two reasons: 
the relative unimportance to the EU and the simultaneous American sanctions. In 
the case of Myanmar and ASEAN, there also appear to be economic incentives for 
the EU to lift the sanctions, although it is difficult to identify a clear correlation.  
This paper finds that the EU’s approach to human rights promotion in third countries 
varies significantly, even in two countries with similar breaches of basic human 
rights, and in the same region, such as China and Myanmar. The main reason why 
the EU response to human rights violations in these two countries differs appears 
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related to the relative economic power and political power of the target country. 
Although other variables, such as interests of individual member states or of the 
international society, may play a role, they all appear to be linked to commercial 
interests. Thus strong commercial and political interests seem to take precedence 
over the human rights promotion of the EU.  
If the EU wants to be perceived as a genuine human rights actor, the approach to 
China will have to change. Either the EU should promote human rights as declared 
in official documents; or the EU should accept that it is not the human rights 
promoter it depicts itself to be. Surely, to be taken seriously in an international setting 
will depend on the EU’s adoption of a consistent approach. The EU cannot claim to 
be the human rights promoter par excellence in the world, if it only promotes those 
rights insofar as this policy does not interfere with its commercial interests. The 
Chinese philosopher Confucius said that the superior man is modest in his speech, 
but exceeds in his actions. What the EU is doing, however, appears to be the 
opposite. 
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